SKILLEMALL.ai

FD worktree-agents

使用 git worktree 隔离多个 Claude Code 实例,由 OpenClaw 主控器并行调度完成同一项目的不同模块。 适用场景:将一个编码项目拆分为独立子任务,让多个 Claude Code 实例并行实现,最后合并 PR。 触发条件:用户要求"多个 Agent 协作"、"并行完成项目"、"worktree 实验"、"多 Agent 编排"时激活。

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jiao yang v1.0.0 5 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 643 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 43/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureGitHubAI and agentsSoftware developmenttype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
40/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
43/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key SKILL.md:112
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export OPENAI_API_KEY="sk-5…9Ef"
    quoted

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 43/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 6 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 643 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 182: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 11 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 6 items
  • +4Has examples (9 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a real worktree automation skill, but it gives autonomous agents broad repository and GitHub authority with weak safety gates and unsafe credential handling.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 28 May 2026