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BD PenTestEngineer

专业渗透测试工程师技能，支持使用 Burp Suite MCP、Chrome DevTools MCP 和 JADX MCP 进行 Web/移动应用安全测试、漏洞挖掘与利用分析

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Smilent v1.0.1 MIT-0 4 files body ≈ 998 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
39/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skill-card.md:2
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    Guides authorized penetration testing of web and mobile applications with Burp Suite MCP, Chrome DevTools MCP, and JADX MCP for vulnerability discovery, exploitation analysis, and reporting. <br>
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skill-card.md:29
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - [ClawHub skill page](https://clawhub.ai/ismilent/pentest-with-bp) <br>
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skill-card.md:31
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - [Penetration test report templates](templates/report_templates.md) <br>

Files scanned: 4. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (PenTestEngineer) differs from the folder (pentest-with-bp)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 36 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 998 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 88: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 19 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 36 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a coherent penetration-testing skill, but it gives powerful testing instructions with limited safeguards for credentials, certificate bypass, and sensitive report contents.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026