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BD Backup

Implement reliable backup strategies avoiding data loss, failed restores, and security gaps.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Iván v1.0.0 2 files body ≈ 845 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:14
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)
    - Same server as source = not a backup — ransomware/fire/theft takes both
    detector
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:18
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    ## Ransomware Protection
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:22
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    - Test restoring from immutable backup — verify ransomware can't corrupt the restore process

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Backup) differs from the folder (backups)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 38 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 845 tokens
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 92: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 10 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 38 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a backup-planning checklist with no executable code or hidden access requests.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026