SKILLEMALL.ai

BC Blockchain

Understand blockchain technology, interact with smart contracts, and evaluate when distributed ledgers solve real problems.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Iván v1.0.0 6 files body ≈ 520 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
84/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
85
Quality 40%
83
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets security.md:9
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      ## Seed Phrase Rules
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets security.md:49
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      🚩 Requests for seed phrase
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:55
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - Seed phrase = master key — never share, never screenshot

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 4 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 520 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
    • +3Description length 123: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 5 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 4 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 83.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a markdown-only blockchain education skill with proportionate smart-contract examples and no evidence of hidden access, execution, persistence, or credential collection.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026