SKILLEMALL.ai

BB Doctor

Triages symptoms, reads lab results and medication risks, and says how urgent something is: emergency now, seen today, or safe to watch. Use when someone describes chest pain, a headache, fever, a rash, dizziness, abdominal or back pain, a cough that will not clear, a lump, or unexplained weight loss and wants to know whether to go to the emergency room; when blood work, imaging, or a screening letter needs reading; when two medicines or supplements may interact, a dose looks wrong, or a side effect started; when a long-term condition — blood pressure, diabetes, asthma, thyroid, cholesterol — needs targets and monitoring; when preparing for an appointment, a second opinion, or a referral; and for a child's fever, a mood or drinking screen, contraception and menopause, or an older relative's medication load. Not step-by-step first-aid drills (`first-aid`), therapy technique (`therapist`), or cycle, pregnancy, and baby tracking (`period`, `pregnancy`, `baby`).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Iván v1.0.2 MIT-0 17 files body ≈ 6 853 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 65/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
100
Quality 40%
66
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
65/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
50
Tools and files w 18
60
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 0

✓ No critical or high findings

Files scanned: 17. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6853 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "changelog"

Process rating: all ten parameters 65/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (read) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Failures and branches. 11 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6853 tokens
  • 100Steps. 44 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Description length 972: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 44 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 66.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is transparent and appears locally focused, but it defaults to reading and persistently updating very sensitive health and related personal records without prior user confirmation.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 10 Sept 2026