SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

BC NAS

Configure, secure, and optimize network attached storage with proper backup strategy, remote access, and media serving.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Iván v1.0.0 6 files body ≈ 425 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
59
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security security.md:22
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    2. **Exposing DSM/QTS = ransomware target** — Shodan scans find open NAS admin panels in minutes.
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security skill-card.md:21
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    Risk: Incorrect backup assumptions can leave data exposed to deletion, ransomware, device loss, or failed restores. <br>
  • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:24
    Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
    1. **RAID is not backup** — RAID protects against drive failure, not ransomware, fire, or accidental deletion. Always maintain off-site backup.

Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 10 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 425 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 119: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +4No input/output examples
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 3 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 10 items

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 59.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This is a documentation-only NAS guidance skill with no executable code, hidden behavior, credential handling, or persistence.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 28 May 2026