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BB Synology

Plan, harden, and recover Synology NAS and DSM setups with storage design, backup discipline, remote access, and Container Manager workflows.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Iván v1.0.0 MIT-0 9 files body ≈ 2 526 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
86/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
92
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 8

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 8
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security backup-and-recovery.md:3
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      Use this file when the user asks about Hyper Backup, snapshots, rsync, migration, ransomware response, or restoration.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security backup-and-recovery.md:19
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Is the incident deletion, corruption, ransomware, failed upgrade, or hardware loss?
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security backup-and-recovery.md:23
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - On suspected ransomware or bad sync, stop automated sync or replication before it overwrites healthy copies.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security backup-and-recovery.md:48
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - If using snapshots for ransomware response, isolate the threat path before restore.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:74
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Disk redundancy protects against some hardware failures, not ransomware, accidental deletion, bad sync, or site loss.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security SKILL.md:111
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Confusing SHR or RAID with backup -> false confidence until deletion, corruption, or ransomware happens
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security storage-and-shares.md:39
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Snapshots help with short-window rollback and ransomware containment, but they do not replace off-device backup.
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security troubleshooting.md:34
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - suspected bad sync, deletion, or ransomware

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "changelog"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 100Steps. 65 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 7 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2526 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 141: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 21 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 65 items
    • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is an instruction-only Synology helper with clear safety gates for NAS changes and optional local notes.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026