SKILLEMALL.ai

FC academic-knowledge-base

面向学术研究者的个人知识中枢。整合 Karpathy LLM Wiki 知识编译能力 + SmartLib 海量文献检索能力,形成私有知识库与外部文献库双轨联动的研究助手。 支持4类数据入库(文献检索结果、用户上传文献、资讯报道、个人学术数据)、研究专题(文献子集+智能命名+笔记+AI分析+导出)、向量化语义检索、分词匹配检索、参考文献管理、Wiki知识层自动维护。 ✨ 亮点:入库文献自动保留原始数据库来源链接(覆盖300+数据库,如Scopus/WoS/EI/PubMed等,覆盖率100%),支持多源交叉验证。 采用懒加载引导式初始化,无需前置配置即可使用。配额管理复用 global-biblio-base 的 gateway 凭证和计次规则(v3.1:5接口,每次调用计1次),配额耗尽后暂停外部检索请求。 适用场景:文献管理、知识积累、论文写作辅助、研究调研。触发词:保存到知识库、知识库统计、我的知识库、给这篇打标签、列出我的专题、文献管理、论文管理、我的论文库、文献收藏、研究笔记、知识整理、学术知识库、论文知识库、文献整理、学术笔记、研究知识管理、收藏这篇文章、加入知识库、文献综述工具。 A personal knowledge hub for academic researchers — integrating Karpathy LLM Wiki + SmartLib literature search + vectorized semantic retrieval. Ingested literature automatically preserves original database source links (300+ databases, 100% coverage) for cross-verification. Quota managed via global-biblio-base gateway with v3.0 billing rules (5 interfaces, 1 quota per successful call), restricted display when quota exhausted. Production URL: read from global-biblio-base/config.json → SMARTLIB_GATEWAY_URL (Gateway v47, version 67)

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: J-levee v3.11.3 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 3 440 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 31 h ago

面向学术研究者的个人知识中枢。整合 Karpathy LLM Wiki 知识编译能力 + SmartLib 海量文献检索能力,形成私有知识库与外部文献库双轨联动的研究助手。…

As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationSales and CRMAI and agentsResearchtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
F
27/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
53
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
56/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. Shorten the description to 1024 characters.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 2

  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key config.json:3
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    "SMARTLIB_GATEWAY_SECRET": "sk-O…mi2",
    quoted
Medium and low: 1
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Read Write Edit Bash WebFetch AskUserQuestion

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error description-long description is 1041 chars, limit 1024
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "agent_created"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "recommends"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "disable"

Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Steps. 17 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3440 tokens
  • low 19 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 1040: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 40 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 17 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 53.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill fits its research-library purpose, but it needs Review because it under-discloses remote data sharing and cross-skill credential/config use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · 19 Jul 2026