SKILLEMALL.ai
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CC bilibili-cli

CLI skill for Bilibili (哔哩哔哩, B站) with token-efficient YAML output for AI agents to browse videos, users, search, trending, dynamics, favorites, and interactions from the terminal

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jakevin v0.6.0 MIT-0 30 files body ≈ 1 878 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 64/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, progress reporting

IntegrationAI and agentsMedia and videoInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
59
Quality 40%
72
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
64/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:29
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    - 🔐 **Smart auth** — auto-extracts cookies from Chrome/Firefox, or QR code login
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store README.md:141
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    2. **Browser cookies** — auto-extracts from Chrome, Firefox, Edge, or Brave
Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store SKILL.md:51
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (detector / deny-list definition)
    Authentication auto-detects local browser cookies (Chrome/Firefox/Edge/Brave). If cookies are found and valid, no manual login needed. Credentials are saved to `~/.bilibili-cli/credential.json`.
    detector

Files scanned: 22. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 64/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 13 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 2 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1878 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 179: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 13 items
  • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 72.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real Bilibili CLI, but it should be reviewed because it automatically uses local browser session cookies and can perform real account actions.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026