FC video-2-skill
(no description)
As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
- Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeSKILL.md:269Accesses a browser credential / cookie store--cookies-from-browser chrome \
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeSKILL.md:303Accesses a browser credential / cookie store--cookies-from-browser chrome \
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storeSKILL.md:318Accesses a browser credential / cookie store--cookies-from-browser chrome \
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storevideo_to_skill_extractor_SKILL.md:269Accesses a browser credential / cookie store--cookies-from-browser chrome \
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storevideo_to_skill_extractor_SKILL.md:303Accesses a browser credential / cookie store--cookies-from-browser chrome \
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high Exfiltration
intent-browser-credential-storevideo_to_skill_extractor_SKILL.md:318Accesses a browser credential / cookie store--cookies-from-browser chrome \
Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- error
frontmatterSKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found - error
name-missingSKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name` - error
description-missingSKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 109 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3583 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- low 35 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 42 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 109 items
- +4Has examples (59 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.