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Secure P2P communication for AI agents. Noise XX handshake, XChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption, connection consent, human verification. Zero central servers.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: JamesEBall v1.0.0 11 files body ≈ 894 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 39/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerAI and agentsInfrastructureSecuritytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
92/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
39/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal src/crypto.ts:8
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      export interface KeyPair { publicKey: Uint8Array; secretKey: Uint8Array; }
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token src/crypto.ts:58
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      const protocolName = sodium.from_string('Nois…E2b');
      quoted

    Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 39/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawdio) differs from the folder (jameseball-clawdio)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 11 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 894 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 152: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 11 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill is a real P2P messaging library, but its security-sensitive claims are undercut by peer-authentication and key-storage weaknesses users should review before trusting it.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026