SKILLEMALL.ai

CC sshx

Operate remote servers with the `sshx` CLI — inspect hosts, dissect remote logs with `sshx text`, run commands over SSH, transfer files over SFTP, apply a single remote file, manage named hosts, store SSH/sudo passwords in the OS keyring or local vault, and run guarded SQL. Use when the user wants structured host discovery, log/exception triage, remote command execution, safe config file changes, upload/download, host management, or safe production database changes. Prefer `--json`. Do not wrap grep/journalctl in `sshx run` when `sshx text` fits.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Jett Wang v1.0.0 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 8 219 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 7 d ago

Operate remote servers with the sshx CLI — inspect hosts, dissect remote logs with sshx text, run commands over SSH, transfer files over SFTP, apply a single…

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, execution cost

IntegrationPostgreSQLMySQLAI and agentsInfrastructurePersonal productivitytype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
74
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 3

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 3

✓ Guard found no suspicious behaviour. 3 matches are attack strings quoted in this security skill's own documentation.

Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 8219 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note edit-residue the text marks something as outdated (lines 112, 141, 185, 514): check that old rules are not kept next to new ones — the full check reads the text for contradictions

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 8219 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 43 steps
  • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
  • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 21 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (11 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 552: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 43 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent SSH administration helper, but it gives agents broad remote admin, secret, and database mutation powers with documented safety-bypass options that should be manually reviewed before use.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 27 Sept 2026