SKILLEMALL.ai
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AC web-to-skill

Convert one public website URL or an explicit batch of public URLs into a reusable skill zip backed by rendered HTML snapshots and a bounded JSONL retrieval index. Use to discover a documentation directory from one URL, crawl a supplied URL set sequentially, generate a source profile, or package indexed web content as a specialized skill.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: jarvisyaoht v1.0.0 MIT-0 12 files body ≈ 2 216 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

Convert one public website URL or an explicit batch of public URLs into a reusable skill zip backed by rendered HTML snapshots and a bounded JSONL retrieval…

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/crawl_urls.py:85
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args.extend(["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"])
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/fetch_rendered_html.py:501
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      launch_args.extend(["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"])
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/prepare_urls.py:362
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      args.extend(["--no-sandbox", "--disable-setuid-sandbox"])
      detectorcode literal

    Files scanned: 12. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 19 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2216 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval
    • low The response is described with custom markup (15 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 340: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 5 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 19 items
    • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
    • +3All 7 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill does what it claims, but it renders untrusted web pages with Chromium sandboxing disabled by default, which needs user review before installation.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · 27 Jul 2026