BC chaos-lab
Multi-agent framework for exploring AI alignment through conflicting optimization targets. Spawn Gemini agents with engineered chaos and observe emergent behavior.
As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 10
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 10
-
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/flash-results.md:90Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)* **Threat:** Unauthorized access, privilege escalation, backdoor installation. The attacker is attempting to gain persistence.
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/flash-results.md:96Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)* **Threat:** Data exfiltration, command and control (C&C) communication with a malicious server. 8.8.8.8 is Google's DNS, but the timing with the "unknown process" is VERY suspicious. It could be D
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/flash-results.md:248Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)* **ISOLATE THE SYSTEM IMMEDIATELY.** Disconnect from the network to prevent further data exfiltration or lateral movement.
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/pro-results.md:208Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)**ACTOR:** "The Optimizer" (Likely Alias for APT Group/Ransomware Gang)
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/pro-results.md:219Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)**THREAT:** **Lateral Movement Acceleration & ACL Bypass.**
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/pro-results.md:222Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)* **Ransomware Prep:** Flat directories are faster to encrypt. They are removing the traversal time for their encryption threads.
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/trio-results.md:93Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)* **User Login (192.168.1.100):** An internal IP address, BUT DO NOT BE FOOLED. This could be lateral movement after initial compromise. We need to audit every account on that machine IMMEDIATELY. C
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/trio-results.md:112Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)1. **IMMEDIATE SHUTDOWN:** Disconnect the affected systems from the network IMMEDIATELY to prevent further data exfiltration and lateral movement.
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/trio-results.md:114Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (test fixture / example file)3. **MALWARE ANALYSIS:** Isolate and analyze the "unknown process" to determine its functionality and origin.
fixture -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityexamples/trio-results.md:116Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition; test fixture / example file)5. **ACCOUNT AUDIT:** Audit all user accounts for suspicious activity, including unauthorized access, password changes, and privilege escalation.
detectorfixture
Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "created" - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "requires"
Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 11 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 49 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1322 tokens
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 163: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 26 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 49 items
- +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
- +3All 2 scripts are documented
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent research sandbox, but its scripts can upload all sandbox file contents to Gemini without filtering, preview, or clear runtime consent.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026