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DD eai-dev-setup

自动化配置 Ubuntu 算法开发环境（中国网络优化版）；当用户需要初始化新系统、配置深度学习开发环境、批量安装开发工具时使用

Not recommendedlow grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Jessy-Huang v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 1 193 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 2 d ago

As a process D 46/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureDockerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
D
44/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
23
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
46/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 17

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 17
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url references/config_templates.md:64
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    alias pipi='pip install -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple'
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url references/config_templates.md:65
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    alias pipia='pip install -i https://mirrors.aliyun.com/pypi/simple/'
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url references/config_templates.md:189
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    alias pipi='pip install -i https://pypi.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/simple'
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-install-from-url references/config_templates.md:190
    Installs a package from an untrusted URL / archive (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    alias pipia='pip install -i https://mirrors.aliyun.com/pypi/simple/'
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/config_templates.md:264
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee /etc/docker/daemon.json <<-'EOF'
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/config_templates.md:305
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "export HF_ENDPOINT=https://hf-mirror.com" >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/config_templates.md:425
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "export HF_ENDPOINT=https://hf-mirror.com" >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cuda_guide.md:110
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv cuda…pin /etc/apt/preferences.d/cuda…600
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cuda_guide.md:118
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp /var/cuda…cal/cuda-*-keyring.gpg /usr/share/keyrings/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cuda_guide.md:137
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo mv cuda…pin /etc/apt/preferences.d/cuda…600
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cuda_guide.md:141
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp /var/cuda…cal/cuda-*-keyring.gpg /usr/share/keyrings/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/cuda_guide.md:174
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo cp /var/cudn…7.1/cudnn-*-keyring.gpg /usr/share/keyrings/
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege references/tools_guide.md:243
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
    sudo tee /etc/docker/daemon.json <<-'EOF'
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc references/tools_guide.md:277
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "export HF_ENDPOINT=https://hf-mirror.com" >> ~/.bashrc
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc SKILL.md:79
    Writes to a shell startup file
    echo "export HF_ENDPOINT=https://hf-mirror.com" >> ~/.bashrc
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/install_docker.py:149
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    f'echo "{repo_content}" | sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/docker.list',
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/install_docker.py:204
    Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (string literal in code, not executed)
    f'echo \'{config_content}\' | sudo tee /etc/docker/daemon.json',
    code literal

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "dependency"

Process rating: all ten parameters 46/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 51 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1193 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 63: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 51 items
  • +4Has examples (12 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
  • +3All 5 scripts are documented
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is mostly a legitimate Ubuntu development setup helper, but it makes broad persistent system and network-routing changes that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026