SKILLEMALL.ai

DC aliyun_log_query

当需要查询阿里云日志(SLS)时使用此技能,支持 CLI 查询日志、分析数据。

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Jewei v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 935 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

当需要查询阿里云日志(SLS)时使用此技能,支持 CLI 查询日志、分析数据。

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

Integrationtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
60
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store skill-card.md:29
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Risk: Broad CLI instructions and SDK-to-CLI mappings could change cloud or local state if administrative operations are used.

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (aliyun_log_query) differs from the folder (aliyun-log-query)
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 14 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 935 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 39: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 14 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 60.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs review because it asks for cloud credentials and gives broad shell/CLI instructions that could expose secrets or change cloud/local state.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 14 Sept 2026