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BC architecture-critic

Adversarial pre-build architecture review. Spawns a structurally independent agent that reviews proposed builds, features, or operational decisions BEFORE any code is written. The critic sees only the task spec and codebase state — never conversation history, enthusiasm, or the proposer's reasoning. Returns APPROVE, REVISE, or REJECT with specific, itemized findings. Use when: starting any new feature, endpoint, schema change, payment/auth touch, or any decision being recommended with confidence. Skip only for: copy/style-only changes under 3 files with no logic, or isolated bug fixes that don't touch payment or auth.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: JJ v1.1.1 MIT-0 11 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 071 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 15 d ago

Adversarial pre-build architecture review.

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

AnalyzerSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Instruction override en-ignore-previous references/ai-builds.md:31
      Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (negated — the text forbids it)
      - [ ] **System prompt sealed** — instructions in system prompt; user input cannot override the system prompt via injection attempts
      negated
    • low Risky intent intent-offensive-security references/checklist-general.md:28
      Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)
      - Does this introduce new privilege escalation paths?

    Files scanned: 11. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "credentials"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 5 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1071 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 625: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 8 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 5 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 5)
    • +3All 1 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill is mostly coherent, but its review gate can be influenced by the untrusted task or repository text it reviews, so users should not rely on its APPROVE result as a security boundary.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 16 Sept 2026