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FF activecampaign-claw

ActiveCampaign agent for marketers + sales: list health, lead scoring, deliverability, campaign postmortems, automation diagnostics, and 40+ more reports.

Not recommendedlow grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: ji282h7 v1.9.4 MIT-0 80 files body ≈ 7 494 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 49/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: scripts/send_time_optimizer.py, scripts/tag_audit.py, scripts/pipeline_audit.py

ProcedureAI and agentsData and analyticsMarketingtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
20/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
49
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
49/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: scripts/send_time_optimizer.py, scripts/tag_audit.py, scripts/pipeline_audit.py
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 24

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 24
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use recipes/deal-hygiene.md:66
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X PUT -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use recipes/deal-hygiene.md:72
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use recipes/deal-hygiene.md:78
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X PUT -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use recipes/welcome-series.md:103
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/contacts.md:10
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/contacts.md:21
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/contacts.md:29
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/contacts.md:33
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/contacts.md:37
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/custom-fields.md:10
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/custom-fields.md:21
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/custom-fields.md:30
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/custom-fields.md:39
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X PUT -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/custom-fields.md:48
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/deals.md:8
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/deals.md:30
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/deals.md:37
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X PUT -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/deals.md:49
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use references/deals.md:53
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:445
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:453
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:461
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST -H "Api-Token: $AC_API_TOKEN" \
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention INSTALL.md:145
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e

Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 7494 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/send_time_optimizer.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/tag_audit.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/pipeline_audit.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/role_address_finder.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/unsubscribe_audit.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/suppression_export.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/tasks_audit.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/sales_rep_performance.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/saved_responses_audit.py
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/tag_lookup.py
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "displayName"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "summary"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "repository"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "keywords"

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: scripts/send_time_optimizer.py, scripts/tag_audit.py, scripts/pipeline_audit.py
  • 0Tools and files. 10 referenced file(s) missing: scripts/send_time_optimizer.py, scripts/tag_audit.py, scripts/pipeline_audit.py
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 7494 tokens
  • 100Steps. 76 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 9 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (5 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -33 of 48 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 154: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 33 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 76 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
  • +1License stated

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 49.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly coherent for ActiveCampaign reporting, but it needs review because some instructions can change CRM data through raw API commands that bypass the advertised write safeguards.
LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 4 Jun 2026