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FF digital-singer

Turn your NuwaAI digital avatar into a singing performer! The avatar sings with lip-synced mouth movements driven by vocal audio, with synchronized background accompaniment. Supports duet/battle mode: avatar sings the first half, user sings the second half with accompaniment. Includes fun scoring and blind box rewards. Powered by NuwaAI humanctrl API. Use when: user wants the digital avatar to sing, karaoke battle, duet mode, or digital human singing.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jianglingling007 v1.3.0 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 1 182 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 40/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: assets/songs/

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
36/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
76
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
40/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: assets/songs/
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • critical Secrets in code secret-openai-key server.mjs:37
    OpenAI-style API key (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    apiKey: "sk-o…LcL",
    quoted
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key server.mjs:25
    Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
    API key + configurable base URL from environment
  • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token server.mjs:37
    Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
    apiKey: "sk-o…LcL",
  • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal server.mjs:37
    Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
    apiKey: "sk-o…LcL",

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: assets/songs/

Process rating: all ten parameters 40/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: assets/songs/
  • 0Tools and files. 1 referenced file(s) missing: assets/songs/
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Steps. 42 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1182 tokens

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -2localhost URLs: will not work for another user
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 455: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 15 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 76.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly an avatar karaoke app, but it handles voice audio and API keys in ways that need careful review before use.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026