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AB dropage-deploy

Deploy an HTML page to the internet and return a public URL. Use when the user asks to deploy, host, share, or publish an HTML file or a zip / tar / tar.gz / tgz archive containing an index.html. Triggers on phrases like "deploy this page", "host this online", "share this HTML", "upload to web", "get a link".

ClawHub Claude Code author: Sayaka v1.4.2 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 2 632 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 34 h ago

Deploy an HTML page to the internet and return a public URL.

As a process B 76/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
94/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
92
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
76/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Failures and branches w 10
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
      Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash(curl
      allowed-tools: Bash(curl *)

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 76/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 19 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 45 steps
    • 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2632 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 5 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 310: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 25 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 45 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (15 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 92.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This skill does what it says: uploads a user-chosen HTML file or site archive to Dropage and returns a public link.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 6 Sept 2026