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FC fund-daily

自动生成基金日报，包含持仓基金数据、估值涨跌、单位净值和财经要闻。支持定时任务（每天下午 4 点自动发送），可配置基金代码列表。输出格式：Telegram 消息 + Word 文档。

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jiashuoji838-afk v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 613 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceTelegramWordInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
33/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
10
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Secrets in code
If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • critical Secrets in code secret-telegram-bot fund_daily.py:77
    Telegram bot token (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN = "8599…AH_…"
    quoted
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence README.md:48
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    schtasks /Create /TN "基金日报" /TR "python C:\完整路径\fund_daily.py" /SC DAILY /ST 16:00 /F
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:61
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    schtasks /Create /TN "基金日报" /TR "python C:\path\to\fund_daily.py" /SC DAILY /ST 16:00 /F
Medium and low: 3
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url fund_daily.py:309
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendMessage"
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url fund_daily.py:324
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendDocument"
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention README.md:53
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 26 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 613 tokens
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 91: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -214 emoji in the instructions: noise for the model
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 31 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 26 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This fund-report skill mostly matches its purpose, but it can send reports to a hardcoded Telegram recipient and depends on an unbundled local script, so users should review it before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026