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BB baoyu-danger-x-to-markdown

Converts X (Twitter) tweets and articles to markdown with YAML front matter. Uses reverse-engineered API requiring user consent. Use when user mentions "X to markdown", "tweet to markdown", "save tweet", or provides x.com/twitter.com URLs for conversion.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Jim Liu 宝玉 v1.117.3 MIT-0 20 files body ≈ 1 712 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
80/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
74
Quality 40%
89
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/cookies.ts:95
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      ? `[x-cookies] Reusing existing Chrome on port ${port}. Waiting for cookies...`
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/cookies.ts:96
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      : "[x-cookies] Chrome opened. If needed, complete X login in the window. Waiting for cookies...");
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/cookies.ts:254
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      `[x-cookies] Failed to load cookies via Chrome DevTools Protocol: ${
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/main.ts:490
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      throw new Error("Missing auth cookies. Provide X_AUTH_TOKEN and X_CT0 or log in via Chrome.");
      quoted
    • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/tweet-to-markdown.ts:117
      Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      throw new Error("Missing auth cookies. Provide X_AUTH_TOKEN and X_CT0 or log in via Chrome.");
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/constants.ts:4
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "Bearer AAAA…uTs%3D1Z…TnA";
      quoted

    Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1712 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
    • low The response is described with custom markup (3 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • -315 of 16 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 254: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 16 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 89.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill does what it advertises, but it uses and stores sensitive X session cookies in ways users should review carefully before installing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 1 Jun 2026