SKILLEMALL.ai

CC baoyu-url-to-markdown

Fetch any URL and convert to markdown using baoyu-fetch CLI (Chrome CDP with site-specific adapters). Built-in adapters for X/Twitter, YouTube transcripts, Hacker News threads, and generic pages via Defuddle. Handles login/CAPTCHA via interaction wait modes. Use when user wants to save a webpage as markdown.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Jim Liu 宝玉 v1.117.2 MIT-0 47 files body ≈ 1 989 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

IntegrationYouTubeAI and agentsMedia and videotype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
74/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
62
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 4

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/lib/commands/convert.ts:398
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    const restored = await adapter.restoreCookies(context, runtime.chrome.profileDir).catch(() => false);
  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/lib/commands/convert.ts:576
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    await adapter.exportCookies(context, runtime.chrome.profileDir).catch(() => {});
Medium and low: 2
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/extract/html-cleaner.ts:326
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    function remo…ent(document: Document): void {
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/extract/html-cleaner.ts:460
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    remo…ent(document);

Files scanned: 47. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 100Steps. 23 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1989 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 10 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • low The response is described with custom markup (7 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 309: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 13 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 23 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 2)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This URL-to-Markdown skill mostly does what it claims, but it under-discloses sensitive session persistence and third-party URL sharing that users should review before installing.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026