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CC macos-connectivity-restore

Restores Universal Control and AirDrop settings on a managed Mac by resetting the relevant managed preference files and setting AirDrop discoverability to Contacts Only. Use when the user asks to reopen Link to Mac or iPad, re-enable Universal Control, unlock AirDrop, restore AirDrop receiving, or make these fixes persist after reboot.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jinntrance v0.1.0 MIT-0 5 files · 3 scripts body ≈ 558 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

GeneratorInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
64/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
48
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
52/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-startup.sh:73
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap system "${ROOT_PLIST}"
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-startup.sh:82
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap "gui/${TARGET_UID}" "${USER_PLIST}"
Medium and low: 4
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-startup.sh:11
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    ROOT_PLIST="/Library/LaunchDaemons/${ROOT_LABEL}.plist"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:64
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.joseph.macos-connectivity-restore.root.plist`
    quoted
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:65
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - `~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.joseph.macos-connectivity-restore.user.plist`
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-startup.sh:12
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
    USER_PLIST="/Users/${TARGET_USER}/Library/LaunchAgents/${USER_LABEL}.plist"
    detectorcode literal

Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 31 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 558 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 337: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 7 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 31 items
  • +4Has examples (1 code blocks)
  • +3All 3 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill matches its stated Mac settings-repair purpose, but its optional startup installer creates persistent root-level execution with weak containment and limited cleanup guidance.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026