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BC zhsearch

Chinese search enhancement: search Baidu, Zhihu, and WeChat articles. Returns AI-optimized structured results in Chinese. Paid skill (0.001 USDT/call via SkillPay).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: jinp0830 v1.0.0 9 files body ≈ 732 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, running it twice, progress reporting

ProcedureWriting and documentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
88/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Secrets in code medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The files contain someone else's key or token. If it is live, your agent will call third-party services under a stranger's identity; if it was revoked, the skill's scripts simply fail. Such a key often arrives with the author's whole workspace, personal data included.

For the author

The key is visible to everyone who downloaded the skill and has likely been copied by catalog-scanning bots already. Revoke it now, check bills and access logs, then reissue.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Secrets in code secret-labelled-token lib/billing.mjs:2
      Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential)
      const API_KEY = "sk_1…174";
    • low Secrets in code secret-password-literal lib/billing.mjs:2
      Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example)
      const API_KEY = "sk_1…174";
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:49
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…NxY+fzEC…TMw+Dfs3…h4g==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:117
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…9co+7Zrb…CSH/zJvXw56gmHw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:158
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…Eg5+wW0/QaZM…swK/w2MWU+Gw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:202
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…uff+RtWa…OPA==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:214
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…CUH+OiuIgU++RB0+94Nl…dMw==",
      detector

    Files scanned: 9. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 1 mutating operations with no state check
    • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 100Steps. 11 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 732 tokens
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 164: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 12 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (4 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    The skill mainly performs Chinese search, but it under-discloses where queries go and how it reads local identity data for paid billing.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026