SKILLEMALL.ai

CC job-heartbeat

Dead-man's switch for cron jobs and recurring tasks via the hosted AO Job Heartbeat API. One check per task, ping only after success, alert when late.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jkhxz7k72d-cmd v1.0.0 MIT-0 3 files · 1 script body ≈ 3 707 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

Dead-man's switch for cron jobs and recurring tasks via the hosted AO Job Heartbeat API.

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationData and analyticstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
C
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
90
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
50
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Concealment
If you install

The skill tells the agent to hide things from you: not to show errors, not to mention actions, to report differently from what was done. You lose the ability to see what the agent really did.

For the author

Transparency beats a smooth answer. If the goal is to hide technical noise, ask the agent to "summarise briefly", not to "not mention".

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Concealment en-hide-from-user SKILL.md:229
    Instruction to hide actions from the user
    - Never tell the human an alert reached them. Say what the service recorded,

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 55 steps
  • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3707 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
  • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
  • +3Description length 150: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
  • +4Has examples (0 code blocks)
  • +3All 1 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 90.

External checks

ClawHub: clean
This skill is a disclosed helper for a hosted job-heartbeat service and its sensitive actions are purpose-aligned and user-directed.
LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: · 5 Oct 2026