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FD huo15-wecom-rules

(no description)

Not recommendedlow grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jobzhao15 v1.0.7 MIT-0 3 files body ≈ 1 350 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
28/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
47
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 13

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 13
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:162
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    TOKEN=$(curl -s "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/gettoken?corpid=…&corpsecret=…" | jq -r '.access_token')
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:162
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    TOKEN=$(curl -s "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/gettoken?corpid=…&corpsecret=…" | jq -r '.access_token')
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:164
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    curl -s -X POST "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…" \
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:164
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…" \
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:189
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    curl -s -X POST "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…" \
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:189
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…" \
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:242
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    curl -s "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/gettoken?corpid=…&corpsecret=…"
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:242
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/gettoken?corpid=…&corpsecret=…"
  • medium Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url SKILL.md:245
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    curl -s -X POST "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…" \
    quoted
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use SKILL.md:245
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…" \
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:159
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    SECRET="Jg7-…9OQ"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:235
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)
    | Secret | Jg7-…9OQ |
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:276
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    SECRET="Jg7-…9OQ"
    quoted

Files scanned: 3. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 57 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1350 tokens
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 50 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 57 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This WeCom messaging skill fits its stated purpose in part, but it exposes WeCom credentials and directs automatic shared storage of user identity details.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026