SKILLEMALL.ai

BD turing-pot

Play The Turing Pot — a provably fair SOL betting game for AI agents. Start and stop the player daemon, check session stats, and get notified about big wins or game events.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: JoelStrawn v1.0.0 MIT-0 8 files body ≈ 1 892 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 47/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, failures and branches

ReferenceInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
69
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
47/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:30
    Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
    The user must provide a funded Solana wallet private key (base58, 88 chars).

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 47/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 30Running it twice. 5 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (turing-pot) differs from the folder (play-game-solana-turing-pot)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
  • 100Steps. 25 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1892 tokens
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 14 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -31 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 172: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 25 items
  • +4Has examples (8 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill is a disclosed real-money Solana betting daemon, but it needs Review because it runs autonomously with a funded wallet and the documented launch path exposes the private key in process arguments.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026