SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

FC revenium

MANDATORY guardrail check BEFORE EVERY OPERATION — read guardrail-status.json first, always, no exceptions. Enforces Revenium guardrails-native budget rules, warns on threshold exceedance, halts autonomous agents on guardrail block, and meters usage into Revenium.

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: revenium.ai v0.6.4 MIT-0 74 files · 35 scripts body ≈ 6 001 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
25/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
  3. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 27

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-cron.sh:98
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    { [[ -n "${EXISTING}" ]] && printf '%s\n' "${EXISTING}"; printf '%s\n' "${CRON_LINE}"; } | crontab -
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-nemoclaw-cron.sh:168
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    { [[ -n "${EXISTING}" ]] && printf '%s\n' "${EXISTING}"; printf '%s\n' "${CRON_LINE}"; } | crontab -
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall-nemoclaw-cron.sh:52
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    printf '%s\n' "${REMAINING}" | crontab -
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall-nemoclaw-cron.sh:54
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    echo "" | crontab -
Medium and low: 23
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell docs/nemoclaw-setup.md:11
    Downloads and executes remote code from an unrecognised host (pipe to shell) (documentation of a security skill)
    curl -fsSL https://www.nvidia.com/nemoclaw.sh | bash
    security skill
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-cron.sh:97
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    EXISTING="$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "revenium-metering" || true)"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install-nemoclaw-cron.sh:167
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    EXISTING="$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -vF "${CRON_COMMENT}" || true)"
    code literal
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall-cron.sh:13
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (detector / deny-list definition)
    crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "revenium-metering" | crontab -
    detector
  • medium Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall-nemoclaw-cron.sh:50
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry) (string literal in code, not executed)
    REMAINING="$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -vF "${CRON_MARKER}" || true)"
    code literal
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin-nemoclaw/package-lock.json:173
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…bgT+a6FmCUdOW+HaIO…nxA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin-nemoclaw/package-lock.json:189
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Lcx+hqB0…GbW+m++MqA6r7eOzq/8FLx…38h/SVTk2qzw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin-nemoclaw/package-lock.json:228
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…xzE+0m1V…42A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin-nemoclaw/package-lock.json:244
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…cKX+fr+AOC+o8K7ZvS+wqX0…S4w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin-nemoclaw/package-lock.json:309
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…OIa++1mxe…PB1/GGM5PL549g==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin/package-lock.json:22
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…YJg+xp+LPXV…GQe/ylDS…Jxg==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin/package-lock.json:184
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…bgT+a6FmCUdOW+HaIO…nxA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin/package-lock.json:200
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…Lcx+hqB0…GbW+m++MqA6r7eOzq/8FLx…38h/SVTk2qzw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin/package-lock.json:239
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…xzE+0m1V…42A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token plugin/package-lock.json:255
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…cKX+fr+AOC+o8K7ZvS+wqX0…S4w==",
    detector
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/install-cron.sh:94
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q "revenium-metering"; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/install-cron.sh:97
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    EXISTING="$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "revenium-metering" || true)"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/install-nemoclaw-cron.sh:164
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -qF "${CRON_COMMENT}"; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/install-nemoclaw-cron.sh:167
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    EXISTING="$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -vF "${CRON_COMMENT}" || true)"
    code literal
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/uninstall-cron.sh:8
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if ! crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -q "revenium-metering"; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/uninstall-cron.sh:13
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v "revenium-metering" | crontab -
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/uninstall-nemoclaw-cron.sh:39
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    if ! crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -qF "${CRON_MARKER}"; then
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention scripts/uninstall-nemoclaw-cron.sh:50
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    REMAINING="$(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -vF "${CRON_MARKER}" || true)"
    code literal

Files scanned: 57. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 6001 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/

Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, write, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 6001 tokens
  • 85Steps. 75 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Failures and branches. 15 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -312 of 20 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 264: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 22 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 75 items
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (2 of 4)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This skill appears purpose-built for Revenium budget metering, but it needs Review because it installs persistent monitoring and overstates how reliably its guardrails block agent activity.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 13 Jun 2026