SKILLEMALL.ai

BC last30days

Research a topic from the last 30 days. Also triggered by 'last30'. Sources: Reddit, X, YouTube, web. Become an expert and write copy-paste-ready prompts.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: johnsonDevops v1.0.0 80 files · 1 script body ≈ 4 782 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: inputs and preconditions, consistency, running it twice

IntegrationYouTubeAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
77/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
84
Quality 40%
67
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 8

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 8
  • medium Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store scripts/lib/vendor/bird-search/lib/cookies.js:103
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store (detector / deny-list definition)
    warnings.push('No Twitter cookies found in Chrome. Make sure you are logged into x.com in Chrome.');
    detector
  • medium Broad scope meta-broad-allowed-tools SKILL.md:1
    Broad tool permissions pre-approved: Bash
    allowed-tools: Bash Read Write AskUserQuestion WebSearch
  • low Broad scope meta-dynamic-shell docs/plans/2026-02-06-fix-skill-execution-fork-mode-plan.md:87
    Shell command executed automatically when the skill loads (Claude Code !`cmd` preamble)
    !`python3 ~/.claude/skills/last30days/scripts/last30days.py "$ARGUMENTS" --emit=compact 2>&1`
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/bird_x.py:181
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/bird_x.py:307
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/vendor/bird-search/lib/twitter-client-base.js:88
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    authorization: 'Bearer AAAA…uTs%3D1Z…TnA',
    quoted
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/youtube_yt.py:125
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/lib/youtube_yt.py:247
    Starts a background / autostarted process
    preexec = os.setsid if hasattr(os, 'setsid') else None

Files scanned: 72. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 30Running it twice. 9 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (last30days) differs from the folder (last30days-skill)
  • 50When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
  • 70Failures and branches. 12 branches
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4782 tokens
  • 85Steps. 105 steps, 1 vague phrases
  • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 13 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • -43 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • -34 of 5 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 154: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 20 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 105 items
  • +3Output format is stated explicitly
  • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 67.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This appears to be a real research skill, but it automatically uses local X browser session cookies and stores raw research data locally in ways users should review first.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 28 May 2026