SKILLEMALL.ai

AB gitlab

Interact with GitLab API for managing projects, issues, merge requests, branches, pipelines, users, groups, and more. Use when the user needs to perform GitLab operations like creating issues, reviewing merge requests, managing branches, or querying project data via the GitLab REST API.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: JonasGao v1.0.0 MIT-0 5 files body ≈ 2 295 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process B 67/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

IntegrationGitLabInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
84
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
67/100
Nearly there
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
30
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Exfiltration net-redirectable-api-key gitlab-client.js:48
      Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another server
      API key + configurable base URL from environment

    Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 67/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 59 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (gitlab) differs from the folder (gitlab-api-client)
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. Tools declared in frontmatter
    • 100Steps. 9 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2295 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low The response is described with custom markup (11 tags): a typed call is more reliable

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 287: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 22 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 84.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a coherent GitLab management skill, but it gives an agent broad write, delete, merge, and webhook authority without clear confirmation safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 28 May 2026