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AC ssh-handoff

Create and reuse a secure shared terminal handoff when a human must authenticate first and the agent must resume work in the same shell session afterward. Use for SSH handoff, sudo handoff, browser-opened temporary terminal access, or LAN-restricted terminal sharing backed by tmux when direct agent authentication is blocked or undesirable.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Jonathan97480 v1.0.1 MIT-0 10 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 2 100 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 14 d ago

Create and reuse a secure shared terminal handoff when a human must authenticate first and the agent must resume work in the same shell session afterward.

As a process C 58/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, failures and branches, progress reporting

GeneratorAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
95/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
98
Quality 40%
91
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
58/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-background-process scripts/start-local-web-terminal.sh:52
      Starts a background / autostarted process
      nohup "${CMD[@]}" >/tmp/ttyd-"$SESSION_NAME".log 2>&1 &
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/start-url-token-web-terminal.sh:331
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      URL="http://$HOST:$PROXY_PORT/?token=…"
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 58/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
    • 85Steps. 72 steps, 1 vague phrases
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 2100 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 341: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 17 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 72 items
    • +4Has examples (11 code blocks)
    • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 3)
    • +3All 4 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 91.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill openly creates temporary shared terminal access, but its implementation has unsafe token and temporary-file handling that could expose or compromise a user shell.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 16 Sept 2026