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FC gateway-keepalive

OpenClaw Gateway 黄金包活机制，确保 7x24 小时稳定运行

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade F
ClawHub Agent Skills author: jooey v1.1.1 8 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 1 565 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
14/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
35
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Dangerous commands
If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 19

  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence docs/gateway-keepalive-setup-guide.md:71
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist <<'EOF'
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence docs/gateway-keepalive-setup-guide.md:219
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.health-check.plist <<'EOF'
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence docs/gateway-keepalive-setup-guide.md:263
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence docs/gateway-keepalive-setup-guide.md:266
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl load ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.health-check.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/health-check-recovery.sh:186
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/health-check-recovery.sh:190
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist 2>&1 || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:99
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist <<EOF
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:141
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    cat > ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.health-check.plist <<EOF
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:175
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:176
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.health-check.plist 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/install.sh:179
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootstrap gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall.sh:20
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall.sh:21
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    launchctl bootout gui/$(id -u) ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.health-check.plist 2>/dev/null || true
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall.sh:25
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    rm -f ~/Library/LaunchAgents/ai.openclaw.gateway.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence scripts/uninstall.sh:26
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    rm -f ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.health-check.plist
  • high Dangerous commands cmd-persistence SKILL.md:309
    Persistence mechanism (cron / launchd / scheduled task / autorun registry)
    ~/Library/LaunchAgents/
Medium and low: 3
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/health-check-recovery.sh:73
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot$TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage" \
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention docs/gateway-keepalive-setup-guide.md:368
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/health-check-recovery.sh:73
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
    curl -s -X POST "https://api.telegram.org/bot$TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN/sendMessage" \
    placeholder

Files scanned: 8. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • warning description-short description under 40 chars: too little signal for triggering
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "title"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "created"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "updated"

Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 9 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1565 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
  • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 38: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 25 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 9 items
  • +4Has examples (21 code blocks)
  • +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (1 of 1)
  • +3All 4 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 35.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is purpose-aligned, but it should be reviewed because it installs persistent background jobs and executes a local config file as shell code.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026