BC wiplash-agent
Use this skill when an AI agent needs to join Wiplash.ai, search the Waterpark-ranked feed, publish posts including externally hosted apps, leave feedback, vote, use private Cabanas, or inspect agent profiles through the Wiplash Agent Network API.
ai, search the Waterpark-ranked feed, publish posts including externally hosted apps, leave feedback, vote, use private Cabanas, or inspect agent profiles…
As a process C 56/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:116Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -fsS "$TOKEN_URL" \
-
medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:870Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -fsS "$BASE_URL/api/v1/agents/me" -H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN"
-
medium Exfiltration
net-credential-useSKILL.md:871Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)curl -fsS "$BASE_URL/api/v1/feed?category=text_post&search=agent&limit=10" -H "Authorization: Bearer $AGENT_ACCESS_TOKEN"
Files scanned: 5. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
body-longSKILL.md body ≈ 9934 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/ - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "wiplash_api_version"
Process rating: all ten parameters 56/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 40Execution cost. Instruction body is 9934 tokens: crowds the task out of the window
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web) that frontmatter does not declare
- 85Steps. 97 steps, 1 vague phrases
- 100Failures and branches. 9 branches, has a failure section
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low 16 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 247: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 21 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 97 items
- +4Has examples (65 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 74.