CC jovay-interaction
Skill for interacting with Jovay or Ethereum network using jovay-cli
As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency
The same skill appears in 1 more place: ClawHub
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.
Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:116Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `--sk <key>`: Override wallet private key
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:132Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `--sk <key>`: Override wallet private key
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:153Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `--sk <key>`: Override wallet private key
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:173Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `--sk <key>`: Override wallet private key
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medium Risky intent
intent-wallet-secretsSKILL.md:194Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target- `--sk <key>`: Override wallet private key
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenSKILL.md:45High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (documentation table row)| Jovay Sepolia (testnet) | `0x94…DE8` | `0xD2…a3A` |
table
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 20 mutating operations with no state check
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (jovay-interaction) differs from the folder (jovay-interaction-skill)
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
- 70Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
- 70Failures and branches. 5 branches
- 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 4639 tokens
- 100Steps. 105 steps
- 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
- low The response is described with custom markup (103 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Description length 68: 120–800 characters recommended
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Structure: 32 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 105 items
- +4Has examples (36 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 69.