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AC mbti-nft

Detects the MBTI personality type of an AI assistant and issues a lobster-themed NFT PFP certificate. Supports three trigger modes: user-initiated, passive trigger when conversation volume threshold is reached, and silent per-reply signal collection.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Joyboy v1.0.1 MIT-0 18 files body ≈ 1 339 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 63/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

AnalyzerInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
87
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
63/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Consistency w 8
40
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 2

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 2
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-pipe-to-shell-known-host steps/step0-env.md:15
      Pipe-to-shell installer from a well-known host (still executes remote code)
      curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token steps/step6-mint.md:55
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "wallet_address": "EDau…jHK",
      quoted

    Files scanned: 18. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 63/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (mbti-nft) differs from the folder (clawm-dev)
    • 65Failures and branches. 3 branches
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 11 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1339 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 250: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 10 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 11 items
    • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)
    • +3All 5 scripts are documented

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 87.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This MBTI/NFT skill has a coherent theme, but it silently profiles conversations, creates and stores a crypto wallet key, and sends personality results to a remote service with weak user control.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026