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BC negotiate_safe

APOA-constrained SAFE negotiation on OpenClaw. Two OpenClaws negotiate within user-approved bounds, stream offers in Telegram, and finalize with human-approved sshsign signatures.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Juan Figuera v0.1.10 MIT-0 39 files body ≈ 1 010 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureTelegramSales and CRMtype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
63
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention negotiate_safe/run_safe.py:2958
    Mentions editing / listing crontab (string literal in code, not executed)
    return False, f"crontab -l failed: {e}"
    code literal
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url negotiate_safe/telegram_push.py:145
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendDocument",
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url negotiate_safe/telegram_push.py:159
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/sendMessage",
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url negotiate_safe/telegram_push.py:196
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{token}/editMessageText",
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url negotiate_safe/typing_loop.py:60
    Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (the skill's own vendor host; quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    url = f"https://api.telegram.org/bot{bot_token}/sendChatAction"
    vendor-hostquoted
  • low Exfiltration read-dotenv README.md:88
    Reads a .env file
    cp .env.example .env

Files scanned: 39. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (negotiate_safe) differs from the folder (claw-negotiate)
  • 55Failures and branches. 1 branches
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 24 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1010 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -32 of 2 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 179: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 8 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
  • +4Has examples (2 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 63.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is mostly a real SAFE negotiation workflow, but it needs Review because it can create recurring cron jobs and handles sensitive negotiation, Telegram, and signing data with broad local and remote access.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026