SKILLEMALL.ai

BC smart-email

Email assistant skill — check emails, AI summaries, daily digests. Supports Gmail, Outlook/M365, Google Workspace. Users interact through their chat platform (Telegram, Feishu, WhatsApp, etc.).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: jundongGit v1.2.0 MIT-0 13 files body ≈ 792 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ProcedureTelegramWhatsAppGmailOutlookInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
85/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
94
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
51/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:24
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…sw1+QZnlLX+/gihc…gkc//J3jVd76o/WS+taUiA==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:87
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…FSj+bWLt…2sH/Kn8E…h6w==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:161
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…rOD+dRAb…H0c+OhJA…o6A==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:200
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…wHD+vkj3…wBQ/hCAQ…tUp/3Qh6…OOw==",
    detector
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:222
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
    "integrity": "sha5…CpK+FtMRQVdIMN6/Df5j…tIC+7KYK…qaA==",
    detector
  • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url server.js:306
    Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
    console.log(`   http://localhost:${PORT}?token=…);
    placeholder

Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"

Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 22 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 792 tokens
  • low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 193: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 14 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
  • +4Has examples (10 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent email assistant, but it handles mailbox contents and credentials with under-disclosed external AI processing and weak secret/security controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026