BC smart-email
Email assistant skill — check emails, AI summaries, daily digests. Supports Gmail, Outlook/M365, Google Workspace. Users interact through their chat platform (Telegram, Feishu, WhatsApp, etc.).
As a process C 51/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
ProcedureTelegramWhatsAppGmailOutlookInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
How to improve
- Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 6
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 6
-
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:24High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…sw1+QZnlLX+/gihc…gkc//J3jVd76o/WS+taUiA==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:87High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…FSj+bWLt…2sH/Kn8E…h6w==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:161High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…rOD+dRAb…H0c+OhJA…o6A==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:200High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…wHD+vkj3…wBQ/hCAQ…tUp/3Qh6…OOw==",
detector -
low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenpackage-lock.json:222High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)"integrity": "sha5…CpK+FtMRQVdIMN6/Df5j…tIC+7KYK…qaA==",
detector -
low Exfiltration
exfil-secret-in-urlserver.js:306Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)console.log(` http://localhost:${PORT}?token=…);placeholder
Files scanned: 13. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
- warning
description-no-whendescription does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when") - note
frontmatter-keyunknown frontmatter key "homepage"
Process rating: all ten parameters 51/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 30Running it twice. 2 mutating operations with no state check
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 22 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 792 tokens
- low The response is described with custom markup (4 tags): a typed call is more reliable
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 193: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 22 items
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is a coherent email assistant, but it handles mailbox contents and credentials with under-disclosed external AI processing and weak secret/security controls.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026