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BC agent-memes

Send meme reaction images in chat. One command to pick & send. Multi-platform (Discord, Feishu, Telegram, etc). Use when the conversation calls for a visual reaction — humor, celebration, frustration, facepalm, or any moment where a meme hits harder than words. Also use proactively when YOU feel something.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: kagura-agent v2.11.0 MIT-0 15 files · 10 scripts body ≈ 959 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 53/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

ReferenceDiscordTelegramAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
82/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
89
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
53/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 7

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 7
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-privilege README.md:34
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions
      sudo cp scripts/memes.sh /usr/local/bin/memes
    • low Exfiltration exfil-webhook-url scripts/telegram-send-image.sh:48
      Webhook / callback URL commonly used for exfiltration (verify the destination) (placeholder value)
      RESULT=$(curl "${CURL_ARGS[@]}" "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TOKEN}/${API_METHOD}")
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration net-credential-use scripts/telegram-send-image.sh:48
      Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service) (the skill's own vendor host)
      RESULT=$(curl "${CURL_ARGS[@]}" "https://api.telegram.org/bot${TOKEN}/${API_METHOD}")
      vendor-host
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/wechat-send-image.sh:35
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/gettoken?corpid=…&corpsecret=…")
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/wechat-send-image.sh:42
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/media/upload?access_token=…&type=image")
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/wechat-send-image.sh:55
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…")
      placeholder
    • low Exfiltration exfil-secret-in-url scripts/wechat-send-image.sh:69
      Credential passed in a URL query string (normal for some APIs — verify the host is the intended service) (placeholder value)
      "https://qyapi.weixin.qq.com/cgi-bin/message/send?access_token=…" > /dev/null
      placeholder

    Files scanned: 15. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning frontmatter-yaml SKILL.md: the frontmatter is not valid YAML (YAML parse error: Nested mappings are not allowed in compact mappings at line 3, column 14: description: Send meme reaction images in chat. One command to pick & send. Mul… ^ ); fields were read line by line. The usual cause is a colon inside an unquoted value

    Process rating: all ten parameters 53/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 30Running it twice. 17 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 100Steps. 16 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 1 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 959 tokens

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -39 of 11 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 307: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 16 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This skill does what it claims, but it gives an agent broad, proactive power to post images to chat platforms and has under-scoped handling of targets, files, and shell execution.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026