SKILLEMALL.ai

AC kai-html-export

Export any HTML file to PPTX or PNG, or publish HTML to a public share URL. Use when the user wants to convert an HTML presentation to PowerPoint, screenshot a web page, export an HTML report as an image, or share HTML online. Triggers: /kai-html-export, --pptx, --png, "export to pptx", "screenshot html", "convert html to powerpoint", "导出为ppt", "导出ppt", "生成ppt", "转成ppt", "导出幻灯片", "html转ppt", "保存为ppt", "可编辑的ppt", "native模式", "导出为可编辑", "share html", "deploy html", "share slides", "发布 html".

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Kaiser v1.2.0 MIT-0 24 files body ≈ 1 135 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 59/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

GeneratorPowerPointInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
93/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
97
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
59/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 3

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 3
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/export-native-pptx.py:1742
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      extra_args = ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'] if is_linux else []
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/export-pptx.py:85
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      extra_args = ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'] if is_linux else []
      detectorcode literal
    • low Dangerous commands cmd-privilege scripts/screenshot.py:45
      Privilege escalation / world-writable permissions (detector / deny-list definition; string literal in code, not executed)
      extra_args = ['--no-sandbox', '--disable-setuid-sandbox'] if is_linux else []
      detectorcode literal

    Files scanned: 14. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 59/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 30Running it twice. 6 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (python) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Steps. 34 steps
    • 100Failures and branches. 4 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1135 tokens
    • high The skill tells the model to perform an irreversible action with no human approval

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • -34 of 7 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 13 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 493: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 9 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 34 items
    • +4Has examples (3 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This HTML export and sharing skill has plausible functionality, but it can publish local files publicly, change Vercel protection settings, and process untrusted HTML in ways that deserve careful review.
    LLM: suspicious (medium) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026