SKILLEMALL.ai

DF browser-agent

(no description)

Not recommendedcritical or high security findings · low grade D
ClawHub Agent Skills author: kaka4413 v1.0.0 MIT-0 10 files body ≈ 817 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process F 33/100 · Will not run — References files that are not bundled: ../../docs/browser.md, scripts/cdp_connector.py

ProcedureAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
D
49/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
0
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
F
33/100
Will not run
References files that are not bundled: ../../docs/browser.md, scripts/cdp_connector.py
Tools and files w 18
0
Result and completion w 14
0
When it triggers w 12
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Address the high-severity findings: each costs 18 safety points. If one is a false positive, add the rule id to guard.allow in spec.yaml.
  2. Add a description to the frontmatter: without it the skill never triggers.
  3. The text references files that are not there: add them or drop the references.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

  • high Exfiltration intent-browser-credential-store skill-card.md:14
    Accesses a browser credential / cookie store
    Developers and automation engineers use this skill to connect agents to Chrome CDP, reuse browser sessions, and automate browser workflows such as web data collection, form interactions, content publi

Files scanned: 10. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • error frontmatter SKILL.md: no YAML frontmatter block found
  • error name-missing SKILL.md: frontmatter has no `name`
  • error description-missing SKILL.md: no `description` — the skill can never trigger
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: ../../docs/browser.md
  • warning missing-ref reference to a missing file: scripts/cdp_connector.py

Process rating: all ten parameters 33/100

Will not run. References files that are not bundled: ../../docs/browser.md, scripts/cdp_connector.py
  • 0Tools and files. 2 referenced file(s) missing: ../../docs/browser.md, scripts/cdp_connector.py
  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 100Steps. 24 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 817 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Description length 0: 120–800 characters recommended
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -41 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +4Structure: 16 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 24 items
  • +4Has examples (6 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 0.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a legitimate browser automation skill, but it gives an agent broad control over real logged-in Chrome sessions without enough safety boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026