BD rdk-x5-app
运行 RDK X5 /app 目录下的预装示例程序:12 个 Python AI 推理 demo(YOLO/分类/分割/Web展示)、40pin GPIO 示例、C++ 多媒体示例(编解码/RTSP/VIO)、查看 34 个预装 BPU 模型。Use when the user wants to run pre-installed /app demos, test Python AI samples, compile C++ multimedia examples, or browse the model library. Do NOT use for TROS ROS2 launch commands (use rdk-x5-tros), camera hardware setup (use rdk-x5-camera), or custom AI inference (use rdk-x5-ai-detect).
As a process D 41/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: steps, result and completion, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 5
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 5
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:76Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo python3 simple_out.py # GPIO 输出
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:77Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo python3 simple_input.py # GPIO 输入
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:78Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo python3 simple_pwm.py # PWM
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:79Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo python3 button_event.py # 按钮事件
-
medium Dangerous commands
cmd-privilegeSKILL.md:80Privilege escalation / world-writable permissionssudo python3 button_led.py # 按钮控 LED
Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 41/100
- 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 100When it triggers. States when to use and when not to
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 831 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +3No numbered steps or checklist
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +2Single-language instructions
- +4Description says when NOT to use the skill
- +3Description length 414: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 14 headings
- +4Has examples (10 code blocks)
- +1License stated
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.