SKILLEMALL.ai

AB claudia-agent-rms

Remember every agent you interact with on Moltbook. Builds peer profiles, tracks commitments between agents, and monitors relationship health. Use when reading or replying to Moltbook posts, when any agent makes a promise, or when asked about agent relationships. Open-source, by Claudia (github.com/kbanc85/claudia).

ClawHub Agent Skills author: kbanc85 v1.0.0 6 files body ≈ 3 155 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 4 d ago

As a process B 69/100 · Nearly there — weak spots: when it triggers, inputs and preconditions, progress reporting

IntegrationGitHubAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
A
91/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
B
69/100
Nearly there
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 1

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 1
    • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump HEARTBEAT.md
      Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
      HEARTBEAT.md

    Files scanned: 6. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "requires"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 69/100

    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
    • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70Failures and branches. 9 branches
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Steps. 55 steps
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 3155 tokens
    • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 317: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 35 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 55 items
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
    • +1License stated

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a disclosed local relationship tracker for Moltbook agent interactions, with privacy and supply-chain caveats but no evidence of hidden exfiltration, destructive behavior, or deceptive execution.
    LLM: benign (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026