BD agency
The Agency - AI role switcher. Activate specialized professional roles (frontend developer, sales agent, marketing specialist, etc.) for different tasks. Use when user says "switch to [role]", "activate [role] mode", "become [role]", or wants to work in a specific professional persona.
As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
PersonaSoftware developmentAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Dangerous commands medium severity
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
If you install
The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.
For the author
Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.
How to improve
For the model run — optional
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 15
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 15
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medium Dangerous commands
cmd-autorun-instructiongame-development/unreal-engine/unreal-systems-engineer.md:58Instructs the agent to auto-run a script on every session- Always run `GenerateProjectFiles.bat` after modifying `.Build.cs` or `.uproject` files
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-cms-developer.md:534Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **Security Engineer** — for penetration testing or hardened server/application configurations on high-value targets
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-security-engineer.md:41Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- Test for business logic flaws: race conditions (TOCTOU), price manipulation, workflow bypass, privilege escalation through feature abuse
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-security-engineer.md:74Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- **High**: Stored XSS, IDOR with sensitive data exposure, privilege escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-security-engineer.md:235Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)5. **Authorization testing**: IDOR, privilege escalation, role boundary enforcement, API scope validation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-security-engineer.md:254Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- [ ] **Authorization**: IDOR, privilege escalation, mass assignment, horizontal escalation
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-solidity-smart-contract-engineer.md:485Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)- When access control gaps allow privilege escalation through role chaining
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-threat-detection-engineer.md:32Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Validate that detections actually fire by running atomic red team tests or purple team exercises
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-threat-detection-engineer.md:58Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use) (detector / deny-list definition)- Cover the full kill chain — detecting only initial access means you miss lateral movement, persistence, and exfiltration
detector -
low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-threat-detection-engineer.md:184Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Privilege Escalation| 13 | 5 | 8 | 38% |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-threat-detection-engineer.md:188Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Lateral Movement | 9 | 4 | 5 | 44% |
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low Risky intent
intent-offensive-securityengineering/engineering-threat-detection-engineer.md:191Offensive-security / dual-use content (legitimate for authorised testing; review intended use)| Command and Control | 16 | 5 | 11 | 31% |
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenengineering/engineering-threat-detection-engineer.md:234High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)run: pip install sigma-cli pySigma-backend-splunk pySi…der
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokenengineering/engineering-threat-detection-engineer.md:273High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential)pySi…der \
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low Secrets in code
secret-high-entropy-tokengame-development/unreal-engine/unreal-multiplayer-architect.md:299High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- Implement `URep…n2D` for open-world games: only replicate actors within spatial cells to nearby clients
quoted
Files scanned: 80. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (agency) differs from the folder (agency-agents-main)
- 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
- 100Steps. 21 steps
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 527 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +5Description quotes 3 example trigger phrases
- +3Description length 286: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 6 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 21 items
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 85.
External checks
ClawHub: suspicious
This is mostly a large role-switching prompt pack, but some included roles request autonomous posting, scheduling, credentials, persistent memory, and broad local tools without enough user-control boundaries.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026