SKILLEMALL.ai

BD AI 书稿图片重设计

将用户提供的 HTML/前端原型整理成一个可复用的网页应用 skill。适用于用户说“把这段 HTML 做成 skill” “把这个网页原型封装成 skill”“生成一个可落地的静态页面 skill”“把图片重设计工具做成 skill”等场景。 该 skill 会把现成前端页面模板落到本地,默认输出为静态 HTML,并支持让最终用户自行填写 API URL 和 API Key。

ClawHub Agent Skills author: kelcey2023 v1.0.100 MIT-0 7 files · 2 scripts body ≈ 388 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai analyzed 3 d ago

As a process D 49/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

IntegrationInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
JSON
Technical rating
B
87/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
95
Quality 40%
75
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
49/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Failures and branches w 10
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Exfiltration medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 1

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 1
  • medium Exfiltration net-credential-use assets/index.html:384
    Credential used in a network call (verify the destination is the intended service)
    const res = await fetch(pollUrl, { headers: { 'Authorization': `Bearer ${apiKey}` } });

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 49/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Failures and branches. Linear process with no failure handling
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (AI 书稿图片重设计) differs from the folder (ai-book-image-redesign)
  • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
  • 100Steps. 42 steps
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 388 tokens
  • 100Running it twice. No mutating operations

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +5Description quotes 4 example trigger phrases
  • +3Description length 190: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 9 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 42 items
  • +4Has examples (5 code blocks)
  • +3All 2 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 75.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
This is a usable static image-redesign tool, but it stores API keys in the browser and can send keys and uploaded manuscript images to user-entered remote endpoints without strong warnings.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026