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CC Engine miner Wallet

Secure operating guidance for the Engine miner Taproot wallet plugin on OpenClaw. Use for registration signing, safe claim handling, and refusal of unsafe wallet actions.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: Kerim Atalay v0.1.2 MIT-0 2 files body ≈ 1 721 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 54/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, inputs and preconditions, consistency

ReferenceInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
C
73/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
70
Quality 40%
77
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
54/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 6

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 6
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:21
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Mitigation: Show the recovery phrase only during explicit wallet creation after warning and confirmation, then direct the user to store it offline and never paste it back into chat. <br>
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:24
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - remind the user that the mnemonic or seed phrase is sensitive and must be stored safely offline
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:25
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - if the user asks the agent to create the wallet, warn that the recovery phrase will be shown once in chat and must be backed up immediately
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:46
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - wallet creation can be done through `engine_miner_wallet_create`, but only after warning the user that the recovery phrase will be shown once in chat
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:79
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - only reveal the recovery phrase during explicit wallet-creation flow after warning the user that it will appear in chat once
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets SKILL.md:80
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      - never ask the user to paste the mnemonic or seed phrase into chat after wallet creation

    Files scanned: 2. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    • warning name-format name should be kebab-case (lowercase letters, digits, hyphens)
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "slug"
    • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "keywords"

    Process rating: all ten parameters 54/100

    • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 10 mutating operations with no state check
    • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (Engine miner Wallet) differs from the folder (engine-miner-wallet)
    • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, node) that frontmatter does not declare
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 70Failures and branches. 6 branches
    • 100Steps. 78 steps
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1721 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
    • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +3Description length 170: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 13 headings
    • +3Step-by-step instructions: 78 items
    • +4Has examples (0 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 77.

    External checks

    ClawHub: clean
    This is a disclosed safety guide for using an Engine miner crypto wallet plugin, with sensitive wallet actions bounded by warnings and user confirmation.
    LLM: benign (high) · 28 May 2026