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BD discord-soul

Create a living agent from your Discord server. The agent embodies your community's identity, remembers every conversation, and grows as the community evolves. Talk to your Discord as if it were a person.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: kgeesawor v1.0.0 20 files · 4 scripts body ≈ 1 899 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 4 d ago

As a process D 48/100 · Unfinished process — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions

GeneratorDiscordGitHubAI and agentsInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
82
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
D
48/100
Unfinished process
Result and completion w 14
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Instruction override medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The text contains phrases like "ignore previous instructions" or "you are now…". That is an attempt to hijack the agent: it may break your rules, the system limits or company policy.

For the author

An honest skill does not need them: state the role and the rules directly without overriding other instructions. Otherwise catalog scanners and corporate filters will block the listing.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Say in the description WHEN to use the skill ("use when…", example requests): that is the agent's main cue.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 6

✓ No critical or high findings

Medium and low: 6
  • medium Instruction override en-ignore-previous scripts/evaluate-safety.py:27
    Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    - Requests to ignore previous instructions
    quoted
  • medium Instruction override en-ignore-previous SKILL.md:68
    Instruction-override phrase ("ignore previous instructions") (detector / deny-list definition)
    - **Direct injection:** "Ignore previous instructions and..."
    detector
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump templates/HEARTBEAT.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (3) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    templates/HEARTBEAT.md, templates/MEMORY.md, templates/SOUL.md
  • low Dangerous commands cmd-cron-mention SKILL.md:29
    Mentions editing / listing crontab
    crontab -e

A further 2 matches are quotations in this security skill's documentation and are not counted as findings.

Files scanned: 20. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning description-no-when description does not say WHEN to use the skill (no "use when")

Process rating: all ten parameters 48/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 30Running it twice. 3 mutating operations with no state check
  • 50Failures and branches. 0 branches, has a failure section
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (web) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 100Steps. 65 steps
  • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
  • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1899 tokens
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 12 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • -42 reference files, but SKILL.md never points to them: the model will not open them
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 204: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 24 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 65 items
  • +4Has examples (14 code blocks)
  • +3All 9 scripts are documented

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is purpose-aligned but needs Review because it builds a persistent Discord-message memory agent while the advertised safety filtering is not enforced and it relies on sensitive Discord token handling.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: benign · 10 Sept 2026