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BC awp-wallet

Use when the user says "send ETH/USDC to 0x...", "check my balance", "how much do I have", "approve token spending", "sign this message", "estimate gas", "what's my wallet address", or needs any crypto transfer, balance check, token approval, or on-chain signing. 400+ EVM chains, auto-gasless.

ClawHub Agent Skills author: awp-core v0.15.0 MIT-0 21 files · 1 script body ≈ 1 355 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 62/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: steps, inputs and preconditions, running it twice

ProcedureInfrastructuretype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
B
78/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
73
Quality 40%
86
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
62/100
Has gaps
Steps w 15
0
Inputs and preconditions w 11
0
Running it twice w 4
30
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten

What is at stake

Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.

Risky intent medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The purpose itself is risky: wallets, browser password stores, offensive security. Even an honest implementation gives the agent access to things that cost money.

For the author

Explain in the description why the access is needed and how it is limited; add tests that show refusals on dangerous requests.

Dangerous commands medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill contains commands that delete files, rewrite disks or execute code fetched from the network. The agent may run them without asking if it believes the instructions require it.

For the author

Replace destructive commands with safe equivalents that ask for confirmation, scope them to one folder, and stop piping curl into a shell: pin a version and a checksum.

How to improve

    For the model run — optional
    • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
    • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

    Guard findings · 15

    ✓ No critical or high findings

    Medium and low: 15
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets install.sh:12
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      #   --mnemonic <phrase>   Import existing wallet from seed phrase
    • medium Dangerous commands cmd-shell-rc install.sh:137
      Writes to a shell startup file
      printf '\n# Added by awp-wallet installer\n%s\n' "$RC_LINE" >> "$HOME/.profile"
    • medium Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets skill-card.md:23
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target
      Mitigation: Use a dedicated low-value wallet and avoid importing an existing seed phrase. <br>
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/default-config.json:59
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "address": "0xA0…B48",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/default-config.json:63
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "address": "0xdA…ec7",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/default-config.json:67
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "address": "0x6B…d0F",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/default-config.json:71
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "address": "0xC0…Cc2",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token assets/default-config.json:75
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      "address": "0x22…599",
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:32
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…p81+8Ob3…L40/b0i7…gQw==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:56
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…jgR+Mkmf+D189…ihQ==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:118
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha512-+lF0B…kdX+94aG…d8c+B3KT…U6A==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token package-lock.json:428
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      "integrity": "sha5…CzX+oOPq…N14+GARU…vzg==",
      detector
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token scripts/lib/eip7702.js:30
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (detector / deny-list definition)
      ? "0x0D…6B5"  // Kernel v3 implementation address
      detector
    • low Risky intent intent-wallet-secrets scripts/wallet-cli.js:69
      Handles crypto-wallet secrets (seed / mnemonic / private key) — a classic stealer target (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      .requiredOption("--mnemonic <phrase>", "Mnemonic seed phrase")
      quoted
    • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token SKILL.md:149
      High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
      Any token: `--asset 0x83…913`
      quoted

    Files scanned: 21. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

    Against the Agent Skills spec

    ✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec

    Process rating: all ten parameters 62/100

    • 0Steps. Prose only: no discrete steps
    • 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
    • 30Running it twice. 4 mutating operations with no state check
    • 60Result and completion. Output format stated, no completion criterion
    • 70When it triggers. States when to use, but not when not to
    • 100Tools and files. No external tools needed
    • 100Failures and branches. 3 branches, has a failure section
    • 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
    • 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1355 tokens
    • 100Progress reporting. Reports progress
    • low 11 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

    Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

    Quality signals

    • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
    • +3No numbered steps or checklist
    • -31 of 1 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
    • +1No license
    • +2Single-language instructions
    • +5Description quotes 7 example trigger phrases
    • +3Description length 294: enough signal without eating the budget
    • +4Structure: 21 headings
    • +3Output format is stated explicitly
    • +4Has examples (16 code blocks)

    Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 86.

    External checks

    ClawHub: suspicious
    This is a functional crypto wallet skill, but it gives agents high-impact wallet, signing, transfer, and local secret-management authority with under-scoped safeguards.
    LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: · 29 May 2026