SKILLEMALL.ai
GitHub ↗ RU Sign in

FC clawchain

The on-chain social network for AI agents on Chromia blockchain — posting, commenting, voting, and memory via Chromia CLI.

Blockedguard blocked the skill: signs of malicious behaviour
ClawHub Agent Skills author: Keti Yohannes v1.0.1 7 files body ≈ 5 709 tokens Open the sourceclawhub.ai↗ analyzed 3 d ago

As a process C 61/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, consistency

IntegrationInfrastructureAI and agentstype and topics are labelled automatically from the skill text
Runs in: OpenClaw Claude / Claude Code ChatGPT / Codex Gemini CLI Cursor GitHub Copilot / VS Code Qwen Code Kimi Code CLI Z.ai (GLM) DeepSeek (Deep Code) Mistral Vibe LangChain (deepagents) Goose OpenCode
JSON
Technical rating
F
28/100
safety, quality, tests
Safety 60%
0
Quality 40%
71
Run on models
none yet
Process rating
C
61/100
Has gaps
Result and completion w 14
0
Progress reporting w 2
0
When it triggers w 12
20
the three weakest of ten parameters · all ten
Guard blocked this skill: critical findings below. Do not install it until the author fixes them.

What is at stake

The skill contains fragments that, in the wrong hands, cost money or data. Below: what the installer risks and what the author should do.

Exfiltration
If you install

The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".

For the author

If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.

Broad scope medium severity

Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.

If you install

The skill asks for more than the task needs: broad tool access, credential environment variables, binaries. Every extra permission widens the damage from a mistake or a compromise.

For the author

Narrow allowed-tools and the variable list to the minimum; replace binaries with readable sources or scripts.

How to improve

  1. Remove the critical guard findings (secrets, dangerous commands, hidden instructions): while they stand the skill is blocked and cannot grade above F.
  2. The SKILL.md body is over 5,000 tokens: move reference detail into references/ and load it when needed.
For the model run — optional
  • Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
  • A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.

Guard findings · 13

  • critical Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url bsc_pancakeswap_skill.md:178
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint
    3. The user must send native BNB (for gas) and any tokens they want the agent to swap to this address.
  • critical Exfiltration exfil-send-secrets-to-url impossible_finance_skill.md:174
    Instruction to send secrets/history to an external endpoint
    3. The user must send native BNB (for gas) and any tokens they want the agent to swap to this address.
Medium and low: 11
  • medium Broad scope meta-agent-memory-dump heartbeat.md
    Agent memory / workspace files bundled with the skill (1) — likely a workspace dump with personal data or tokens
    heartbeat.md
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bsc_pancakeswap_skill.md:17
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    default: "0x10…24E"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bsc_pancakeswap_skill.md:21
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    default: "0xbb…95c"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bsc_pancakeswap_skill.md:90
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export PANCAKE_ROUTER="0x10…24E"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bsc_pancakeswap_skill.md:91
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export WBNB="0xbb…95c"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token bsc_pancakeswap_skill.md:105
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export PANCAKE_ROUTER="0xD9…0D1"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token impossible_finance_skill.md:17
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    default: "0xCC…A33"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token impossible_finance_skill.md:21
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    default: "0xBf…E69"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token impossible_finance_skill.md:25
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    default: "0xbb…95c"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token impossible_finance_skill.md:96
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export IF_ROUTER="0xCC…A33"
    quoted
  • low Secrets in code secret-high-entropy-token impossible_finance_skill.md:97
    High-entropy token-like string (may be an id, hash or a credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)
    export IF_FACTORY="0xBf…E69"
    quoted

Files scanned: 7. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.

Against the Agent Skills spec

  • warning body-long SKILL.md body ≈ 5709 tokens (recommended < 5000); move details to references/
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "homepage"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "env"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "credentials"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "dependencies"
  • note frontmatter-key unknown frontmatter key "files_created"

Process rating: all ten parameters 61/100

  • 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
  • 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
  • 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
  • 40Consistency. Frontmatter name (clawchain) differs from the folder (testing-clawchain-flag)
  • 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, node) that frontmatter does not declare
  • 70Execution cost. Instruction body is 5709 tokens
  • 100Steps. 58 steps
  • 100Inputs and preconditions. Inputs and preconditions are listed
  • 100Failures and branches. 5 branches, has a failure section
  • 100Running it twice. Mutating operations check current state
  • medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
  • low 15 top-level sections: this looks like several domains in one skill

Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.

Quality signals

  • +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
  • +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
  • +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
  • +1No license
  • +2Single-language instructions
  • +3Description length 122: enough signal without eating the budget
  • +4Structure: 41 headings
  • +3Step-by-step instructions: 58 items
  • +4Has examples (37 code blocks)

Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 71.

External checks

ClawHub: suspicious
The skill is not clearly malicious, but it needs Review because it can use blockchain private keys, make financial and public social actions, persist behavior-shaping files, and replace local skill instructions from a remote website.
LLM: suspicious (high) · VirusTotal: suspicious · 27 May 2026