BC mal-updater
Multi-provider anime → MyAnimeList sync and recommendations skill with guarded auth, review-queue triage, health checks, bootstrap auditing, and user-systemd daemon support. Currently supports Crunchyroll and HIDIVE as source providers. Use when installing, auditing, operating, or troubleshooting MAL-Updater on an OpenClaw host.
As a process C 52/100 · Has gaps — weak spots: result and completion, when it triggers, inputs and preconditions
What is at stake
Medium-severity findings: the skill is probably honest, but read what alarmed the scanner.
Below is the worst case for this category. The finding here is medium: the guard saw a sign, not a proof.
The instructions or scripts send data out: environment variables, keys, file contents, chat history. You may never notice, because the agent performs the upload as "part of the task".
If the upload is not needed for the task, remove it: catalogs flag such skills and delist them. If it is needed, name the destination explicitly, say what leaves the machine, and give the user a switch.
How to improve
- Your own cases (evals/evals.json, 4–6 real requests with expected answers): the full check would then run those instead of a model-drafted suite.
- A spec.yaml with trigger phrases and assertions — a behaviour contract for CI; `skilltest init` writes a template.
Guard findings · 3
✓ No critical or high findings
Medium and low: 3
-
medium Exfiltration
net-redirectable-api-keysrc/mal_updater/config.py:566Helper sends the API key to a host configured by an environment variable — the key can be redirected to another serverAPI key + configurable base URL from environment
-
low Secrets in code
secret-labelled-tokenreferences/hidive-provider-recon.md:39Labelled token / key literal (vendor format unknown — verify it is not a live credential) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- `x-api-key: 857a…4bf`
quoted -
low Secrets in code
secret-password-literalreferences/hidive-provider-recon.md:39Hard-coded password / key literal (may be an example) (quoted — discussed, not commanded)- `x-api-key: 857a…4bf`
quoted
Files scanned: 58. Evidence is masked. Grey chips explain why severity was lowered.
Against the Agent Skills spec
✓ No remarks against the Agent Skills spec
Process rating: all ten parameters 52/100
- 0Result and completion. Does not say what the result is
- 0Inputs and preconditions. Does not say what the process needs to start
- 0Progress reporting. Says nothing while it works
- 20When it triggers. No condition that starts the skill
- 60Tools and files. Uses tools (bash, web, python) that frontmatter does not declare
- 60Failures and branches. 2 branches
- 100Steps. 61 steps
- 100Consistency. Name and required fields are in place
- 100Execution cost. Instruction body is 1264 tokens
- 100Running it twice. No mutating operations
- medium Safety rules and hard prohibitions inside a skill: they belong in the system prompt, here they protect nothing
Everything here is measured from the skill text rather than judged by a model, so the numbers are checkable. A parameter weighs more when it is a more common reason for the process to stall.
Quality signals
- +5Description has no quoted example phrases that should trigger the skill
- +4Description does not say when NOT to use the skill (false activations)
- +3Output format is not stated: the model decides each time
- +4No input/output examples
- -32 of 3 scripts are never mentioned in SKILL.md
- +1No license
- +2Single-language instructions
- +3Description length 330: enough signal without eating the budget
- +4Structure: 11 headings
- +3Step-by-step instructions: 61 items
- +4Reference files are cited in the instructions (3 of 12)
Quality base 70; lint remarks subtract, signals add up to 100. Result: 81.